



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**THE DEFENSE STRATEGIES OF CHINA AND RUSSIA:  
A STUDY OF EFFECTIVENESS**

by

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March 2019

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**THE DEFENSE STRATEGIES OF CHINA AND RUSSIA:  
A STUDY OF EFFECTIVENESS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

China and Russia are among the strongest military powers in the world. Both are improving their defense capabilities for different reasons: China aims to achieve hegemon status, and regaining superpower status appears to be Russia's strategic end. Given the centrality of military prowess to China's and Russia's ambitions, a key component of each state's strategic calculus is its defense strategy. Comprehending Chinese and Russian defense strategies and the relative effectiveness of those strategies is thus an essential part of understanding how these states likely perceive and assess the global security environment and how their ambitions could affect the international order.

This thesis therefore investigates the following questions: What are the defense strategies of China and Russia, and are their defense strategies implemented effectively? This thesis addresses these questions by analyzing the published defense strategies of China and Russia and assessing these strategies against their defense expenditures. The research finds that China has been effectively implementing its defense strategy because its economy is robust enough to support the strategy and its one-party rule provides coherent objectives. The Russian defense strategy, by contrast, has not been implemented effectively due to the country's inability to provide enough resources to achieve its objectives. Moreover, Russian defense strategy objectives conflict with one another.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AMS	Academy of Military Sciences
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CMS	China's Military Strategy
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economy
DoD	Department of Defense
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU	National Defense University
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAA	People's Liberation Army Army
PLAAF	People's Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PRC	People's Republic of China
RMD	Russian Military Doctrine
SAP	State Armament Program

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Scholars today agree that China and Russia are among the strongest military powers in the world.<sup>1</sup> Both countries are continually improving their defense capabilities for very different reasons: China's fast economic growth has allowed commensurate growth in its military sector, which it is leveraging in an effort to achieve hegemon status by challenging the United States' influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Scholars see this ambition as a possible source of conflict between the two countries.<sup>2</sup> Although its national income lags behind that of China, Russia's military strength still ranks among the top few countries in the world. Russia was a key player in international relations from the end of World War II until the end of the Cold War when the Soviet Union collapsed; now, regaining superpower status appears to be its strategic end, and military power is Russia's primary means to achieve this end—namely, by posing a threat to the Western world.

These two states' pursuit of their national interests, combined with their comparative military prowess, has become a major factor in the global security environment.<sup>3</sup> Given the centrality of this military prowess to China's and Russia's ambitions, a key component of each state's strategic calculus is its defense strategy. In today's rapidly changing global security environment, every country has to pay close attention to the possible outcomes of changes that could challenge its national interests. To be ready for any sudden changes, every country has to have a strategy to defend its sovereignty, independence, and vital national interests. Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economy (DIME) are the key means to defend these interests; out of these four, the

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<sup>1</sup> "2018 Military Strength Ranking," Global Firepower, accessed June 8, 2018, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>; "The 80 Most Powerful Countries in the World," *U.S. News and World Report*, accessed June 8, 2018, <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/power-rankings>; Christopher Woody, "These Are the 25 Most Powerful Militaries in the World — and There's a Clear Winner," *Business Insider*, accessed June 8, 2018, <http://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-ranked-2018-2>.

<sup>2</sup> Robert S. Ross, "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia," *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 355–95, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601028206>.

<sup>3</sup> Ronald O'Rourke, *A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense--Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. R43838 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf>.

Military component is the ultimate backup for the other means. Defense strategy is the crucial high-level management process of developing abundant capability and capacity to satisfy any needs when the state calls on the military for regular and emergency matters.

Clearly comprehending Chinese and Russian defense strategies and the relative effectiveness of those strategies is, therefore, an essential part of understanding how these states likely perceive and assess the global security environment and how their ambitions could affect the international order. However, thus far, little comparative analysis of these great powers' defense strategies has materialized in the literature. This thesis therefore seeks to answer the following question: What are the defense strategies of China and Russia, and are their defense strategies implemented effectively? This analysis is then used to examine a sub-question: What lessons might these defense strategies offer a smaller state—specifically, Mongolia—to improve its defense strategy in the context of the current global security environment? Both China and Russia are strategically important partners to Mongolia; geographically, landlocked Mongolia is sandwiched between China and Russia. Therefore, Mongolia has chosen the Third Neighbor Policy to balance its influential neighbors. China and Russia perceive the chosen third neighbors of Mongolia—particularly the United States and other Western countries—as the biggest threat to the existing world order, and vice versa. To manage these relationships, it is therefore crucial that Mongolia, as a young democracy and a relatively weak state, understand Chinese and Russian defense strategies and determine whether they are implemented effectively.

#### **A. RESEARCH QUESTION**

What are the defense strategies of China and Russia, and are their defense strategies implemented effectively?

Sub-question: What lessons might these defense strategies offer a smaller state—specifically, Mongolia—to improve its defense strategy in the context of the current global security environment?

## **B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION**

Rising China and resurging Russia have become the major threats in their respective regions, especially to liberal democratic countries, due to both countries' security policies and expanding military capacities.<sup>4</sup> Most of the countries in these regions have very strong economic ties with China and Russia through immense amounts of exports and imports. Moreover, both countries' unclear approaches to their strategic goals—namely, Chinese “sharp power” and the Russian Gerasimov doctrine—create fear in liberal democracies because of their ambiguity. China and Russia have different approaches to explain their national security situations, and defense strategy represents how military force is employed to support the other means of national strategy within the frame of a state's core national interests.

Thus, this research is significant in this moment of possible changes in the international order since military power is the ultimate backup for the other means contained in the DIME paradigm. To understand how globally influential powers (in their respective capacities) China and Russia view the global security environment and how their defense strategy is tied to this view requires a thorough study of these states' defense strategies, which will enable a better understanding of how effectively these states are implementing their strategies.

## **C. LITERATURE REVIEW**

This literature review examines scholarship in a number of areas related to defining and assessing defense strategy, setting forth the major themes these documents articulate, and outlining the stances of the two countries on their respective strategies. To assess whether Chinese and Russian defense strategies are implemented effectively, it is first necessary to define what a defense strategy is. According to former U.S. Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey, “Strategy is about balancing ends, ways, and means; that is, our

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<sup>4</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance*, 2018, vol. 118, no. 1, (London: Routledge, 2018), 5, 6.

national objectives, our operational concepts, and the resources available to us.”<sup>5</sup> Put another way, it means juggling three balls without dropping any while trying to achieve the ultimate goal.

Finding generic criteria for comparing defense strategies of different countries is challenging. While many comparisons exist of military and national power between various states, the literature offers no standard or definitive way to measure the effectiveness of a defense strategy.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, a number of scholars have put forth criteria, the most useful of which are contained in Thomas Young’s article “The Failure of Defense Planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: Ascertaining Causation and Determining Solutions.” In this article, Young suggests that the major cause of failure of a defense strategy is defense planning not properly tied to resources—specifically, funding.<sup>7</sup> The article further explains how European post-communist countries failed to set forth viable defense strategies due to lack of coherence between their planning and budgeting despite North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners’ efforts to teach them a budgetary programming method. On that basis, Young proposes a way to determine whether a defense strategy is effective: to compare what a state says in its strategy with what it spends to implement that strategy. In other words, an effective defense strategy will have sufficient funding to achieve all its objectives.

Even with a consistent standard for measuring effectiveness, however, there is also the issue that the two states this research investigates—China and Russia—outline their defense strategies in different ways. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council, the top administrative units of China, determine China’s defense-related strategies. Emerging strong political leader and Chinese president Xi Jinping is an influential figure in dictating the new strategies of China; his centralization of power is

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<sup>5</sup> Chuck Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 2014, 59, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014\\_Quadrennial\\_Defense\\_Review.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> “Comparison Countries Military Strength,” accessed June 8, 2018, <http://armedforces.eu/compare/country>.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas-Durell Young, “The Failure of Defense Planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: Ascertaining Causation and Determining Solutions,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41, no. 7 (April 11, 2017): 1031–1057, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307743>.

another feature of new Chinese strategies.<sup>8</sup> China's National Strategy includes ambitious domestic goals of not only achieving two centenary goals under the overarching name of the "Chinese Dream"— "China's national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CCP celebrates its centenary; and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People's Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary"<sup>9</sup>—but also reforming the global order for China's own good under the Chinese foreign policy "Harmonious World," used since 2005.<sup>10</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman phrases it that "China unswervingly takes the road of peaceful development, strives to build a harmonious socialist society internally, and promotes the building of a harmonious world enjoying lasting peace and common prosperity externally."<sup>11</sup>

In this context, China's defense-related documents have been published every two years as "China's National Defense" and have addressed its general security situation, its defense policy, modernization, and deployment of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), defense expenditure, mobilization, and arms control;<sup>12</sup> the last "China's National Defense" document was published in 2010. The term "defense strategy" is not used in China: they call their version of the document "Military Strategy." In 2015, the State Council of China separately published its "Military Strategy" document, which is the current main defense strategy of China, the ninth in a series of government white papers.<sup>13</sup> China's Military Strategy (CMS) highlights power projection capability, offensive and defensive air

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<sup>8</sup> Saša Petricic, "China's Xi Jinping Grows in Power and Influence, Prepares to 'Act Big'," CBC, October 25, 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-congress-xi-jinping-petricic-1.4371251>.

<sup>9</sup> Anthony Cordesman, "Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2016," 2, accessed January 17, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-strategy-and-military-modernization-2016>.

<sup>10</sup> Timothy R. Heath et al., *The PLA and China's Rejuvenation: National Security and Military Strategies, Deterrence Concepts, and Combat Capabilities* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2016), 3–6.

<sup>11</sup> Cordesman, 50.

<sup>12</sup> "PRC White Papers," U.S.-China Institute, accessed June 8, 2018, <https://china.usc.edu/prc-white-papers>.

<sup>13</sup> Abhijit Singh, "Decoding China's Military Strategy White Paper: Assessing the Maritime Implications," Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, accessed June 2, 2015, [https://idsa.in/idsacomments/DecodingChinasMilitaryStrategyWhitePaper\\_asingh\\_020615](https://idsa.in/idsacomments/DecodingChinasMilitaryStrategyWhitePaper_asingh_020615).

operations, and open-seas protection, which implies its growing desire to be the hegemon not only economically but also militarily.

CMS contains six sections: Preface, National Security Situation, Missions and Strategic Tasks of China's Armed Forces, Strategic Guideline of Active Defense, Building and Development of China's Armed Forces, Preparation for Military Struggle, and Military and Security Cooperation.<sup>14</sup> Generally, the strategy highlights that the military area is the key backup for peaceful Chinese development; meanwhile, economy and politics support building an even stronger military to keep global peace under a new world order. Strategic military tasks described in the document include various approaches to achieving these aims. The Strategy firmly states, "Without strong military, a country can be neither safe nor strong."<sup>15</sup> China's pursuit of a new world order is implied in the CMS, and what China is doing today in the South China Sea region is an explicit manifestation of how China pursues its ambition despite the opposition of U.S.-aligned countries.<sup>16</sup>

Russia's defense strategies are illustrated in its military doctrine, which was released in December 2014 and approved by President Vladimir Putin, coming out ahead of the latest "Russian National Security Strategy."<sup>17</sup> Releasing the military doctrine ahead of the national security strategy implies that the Russian military is Moscow's key means of establishing national security. Centralization of state-level decision-making power to a single person is one similarity between the Russian and Chinese strategic approaches. In addition, the trending "Gerasimov doctrine"<sup>18</sup> was published in February 2013 and possibly influenced the new Russian military doctrine and national security strategy.<sup>19</sup> Russia sees

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<sup>14</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, *China's Military Strategy* (Full Text), May 27, 2015, [http://english.gov.cn/archive/white\\_paper/2015/05/27/content\\_281475115610833.htm](http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm).

<sup>15</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>16</sup> Alexander Neill, "Shangri-La Dialogue: How Xi's China Solution Works - Look at South China Sea Troubles," *Straits Times*, June 1, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/how-xis-china-solution-works-look-at-south-china-sea-troubles>.

<sup>17</sup> Olga Olikier, "Unpacking Russia's New National Security Strategy," CSIS, accessed June 8, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy>.

<sup>18</sup> Valery Gerasimov, "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations," *Military Review*, February 2016, 23–29.

<sup>19</sup> United States Defense Intelligence Agency, *Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations*, Report No. DIA-11-1704-161 (Washington, DC: DIA, 2017).

U.S.-led NATO forces as a major threat to Russia and suspects the United States and NATO will use unconventional, non-military warfare against Russia.<sup>20</sup> That said, Russian national security strategy promotes the importance of Russian participation in global international affairs. The document even says Russia is ready to work with the United States.<sup>21</sup> The overall goal of Russia here is to pose a Great Power stance in the international political realm.

The “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” consists of three main sections: General Provision, Military Dangers and Military Threats to the Russian Federation, and The Military Policy of Russian Federation. The first two sections define general terms used in the document and what types of threats are imminent against the Russian Federation. The document states that increasing interstate competition causes various levels of instability in Russia’s neighboring regions, and the existing world order cannot provide equal levels of security to different states.<sup>22</sup> The document designates as the most imminent threat NATO countries’ violation of international law and possible expansion around Russian Federation regions. Most other defined threats and dangers against the Russian Federation either fall under or relate to this major threat.<sup>23</sup> The Military Policy of the Russian Federation further describes what Russia is doing to improve its military and reduce the possibility of conflicts. This section is further divided into subsections of conflict prevention measures, wartime tasks of its military, and military and economic support for defense.<sup>24</sup> This last subsection outlines the tasks of economic support for defense purposes, development of the military-industrial complex, and the Russian Federation’s cooperation with foreign militaries. Overall, The Military Policy section of

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<sup>20</sup> Kristi Raik et al., “The Security Strategies of the US, China, Russia and the EU,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), June 15, 2018, 46, 47, <https://www.fii.fi/en/publication/the-security-strategies-of-the-us-china-russia-and-the-eu>.

<sup>21</sup> “Russian-National-Security-Strategy,” IEEE, December 31, 2015, 98, , <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf>.

<sup>22</sup> Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Посольство России в Великобритании. Accessed June 8, 2018. <http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029>.

<sup>23</sup> Russian Federation.

<sup>24</sup> Russian Federation.

the document is crucial to understanding what Russia will do to achieve the goals laid out in this strategic document.

The primary challenge for this thesis is the fact that China and Russia are authoritarian governments; therefore, finding comprehensive defense-related information about the plans described in their strategy-policy documents is difficult. Moreover, statistics on what exactly China and Russia spend to procure and build defense-related techniques and technologies are limited to open-access information. Nevertheless, there are reliable resources available, including the United States Annual Congressional Reports, Defense Intelligence Agency Report, International Institute for Strategic Studies data, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data, and various governmental and think-tank reports.

On China, Carl Minzner, the author of the book *End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival is Undermining Its Rise*, argues that the rise of China is coming to an end economically, ideologically, and politically due to its increasing internal problems with authoritarianism.<sup>25</sup> This analysis suggests the question of how China will achieve its two centenary goals if its development stops before it becomes the hegemon. A slow economy would not allow the government a large defense expenditure. In spite of this forecast, however, China's defense budget has kept increasing every year since 2008, from US\$60.2 billion to US\$174.6 billion in 2018.<sup>26</sup> This growth suggests that military development takes high priority as part of China's reaching its strategic goals despite its slowing economic growth. That said, the "China Power" project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has reported that it is difficult to measure China's defense expenditures because of inconsistent defense budget announcements, lack of detailed budget reporting, lack of pricing information for procurement and training, and the defense

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<sup>25</sup> Center for Strategic and International Studies, "The Erosion of China's Reform Era," *ChinaPower* (podcast 17), CSIS, released May 22, 2018, <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/the-erosion-of-chinas-reform-era/>.

<sup>26</sup> Center for Strategic and International Studies, "What Does China Really Spend on Its Military?," *ChinaPower Project* (blog), CSIS, last updated October 9, 2015, <https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/>.



budget's omission of spending on paramilitary forces and military research and development.<sup>27</sup>

In addition, the national interest and military modernization of China is not limited to regional considerations: China also strives for global influence. Military modernization in China has shifted its focus to “supporting missions beyond China’s periphery, including power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.”<sup>28</sup> China’s ambition has at least three vehicles to reach its strategic goal other than military power: Economic and political vehicles are visibly progressing, including economic mega projects and governmental reforms. The third, intangible approach of China is called “sharp power,” which tries to buy political influence in foreign nations to oppose international judgment of China’s controversial strategic behavior.<sup>29</sup> Sharp power also includes how China uses its academics and influence to make Chinese behavior the norm in foreign countries.<sup>30</sup> All of these approaches have only one backup, however: a strong military. Hence, China cannot afford to slow down military modernization.

A number of scholars follow Russian military modernization as well; they state that the modernization process is continuing and has passed the difficult initial phases already.<sup>31</sup> Russia aims to complete military modernization by 2020. According to Kier Giles, restructuring the force is close to complete, and the Russian defense industry has passed the phase of struggling to produce new equipment.<sup>32</sup> Moscow’s attempts to send higher numbers of service members to Ukrainian and Syrian conflict areas with shorter

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<sup>27</sup> Center for Strategic and International Studies, “What Does China Really Spend on Its Military?”

<sup>28</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Dept. of Defense, May 15, 2017), Executive summary, [https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017\\_China\\_Military\\_Power\\_Report.PDF](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF).

<sup>29</sup> “How China’s ‘Sharp Power’ Is Muting Criticism Abroad,” *Economist*, December 14, 2017, <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/12/14/how-chinas-sharp-power-is-muting-criticism-abroad>.

<sup>30</sup> “How China’s ‘Sharp Power’ Is Muting Criticism Abroad.”

<sup>31</sup> United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 13.

<sup>32</sup> Keir Giles, *Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Rearmed Military*, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 3, 2017), 5–7.

deployment time further show that Russia has passed the initial step of military reform and that now the Russian military leaders are concerned with exposing their personnel to operational experience.<sup>33</sup> Moscow is not only investing in personnel training but also in testing new weapons technologies in both conflicts whenever possible. Even the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces has stated that the Russian military is gaining operational experience from Syria.<sup>34</sup> This approach complements the progress of Russian defense reform. An important question, however, is whether Russia is rich enough to continue its defense reform. One key contributor to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War was over-spending on defense. Will the Russian Federation face the same fate in the future? Giles addresses this question by saying that, in the short- and mid-term of Russia's strategy, there is no alternative to heavy defense spending since modernization of its armed forces continues to be a high priority.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, a 17-percent decline in Russian defense spending from 2016 to 2017 caught the attention of international actors, who wondered whether it was sign of slowing military modernization.<sup>36</sup> Giles also suggests that official Russian numbers given in international media could might not fully represent what the authoritarian government has spent on its military.<sup>37</sup>

One goal that unites Chinese and Russian strategic interests is degrading the United States' influence in their periphery. Currently, the U.S.-led, rule-based international order contradicts their national interests. Russia tries to situate itself in the position of a superpower in the current order, whereas China's efforts are to offer its own version of the international order, if it can build it. Neither country's wishes can be realized without strong military power. Therefore, their defense strategies are the center of gravity of their

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<sup>33</sup> Giles, 8.

<sup>34</sup> Valery Gerasimov, "Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country," *Military Review*, December 2017, 22–27.

<sup>35</sup> Giles.

<sup>36</sup> Ivana Kottasová, "Russian Military Spending Drops for First Time in 20 Years," CNNMoney, May 2, 2018, <http://money.cnn.com/2018/05/02/news/russia-defense-spending-plunge/index.html>.

<sup>37</sup> Giles.

international security environment—a consideration that will be instrumental in comparing strategy or doctrine with actual expenditures.

#### **D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES**

The research questions suggest essentially two possible outcomes. The first is that the defense strategies of China and/or Russia are not implemented effectively because the authoritarianism of both countries has produced a mismatch between defense strategies and defense expenditures; that is, the authoritarian governments can allocate more funding to defense than the economy can technically handle and can hide their level of defense spending by violating their own budget allocations. Alternatively, the defense strategies of China and/or Russia could be effective strategic documents in that most of their defense objectives and priorities are implemented as stated, with an adequate and sustainable supply of funding.

#### **E. RESEARCH DESIGN**

This thesis analyzes the published defense strategies of China and Russia through the methodological lens of assessing their strategies against their defense expenditures. The analysis is limited to open-access defense-related government documents. A qualitative analysis examines the Chinese and Russian defense strategies to determine whether these strategies have clear objectives and, if so, what those objectives are. A quantitative analysis looks for any indicators that these countries are spending in excess of their budgeted procurement costs in an attempt to realize their defense strategies.

Finally, based on the comparison of the two countries' defense strategies, the thesis provides critical analysis of potential lessons for Mongolia applicable to its future defense planning.

#### **F. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS**

The remainder of this thesis consists of three chapters. Chapters II and III focus on China's and Russia's defense strategies, respectively. These chapters begin by outlining these countries' strategic objectives, identifying how they put forth their respective goals in their strategic documents. These two chapters then apply Young's framework to analyze

to what extent the two countries' defense expenditures are able to support their strategy documents. Chapter IV highlights the key findings with respect to the effectiveness of China's and Russia's defense strategies. This final chapter also offers the implications of these findings for Mongolia's further defense planning.

## II. CHINA'S DEFENSE STRATEGY STUDY

This chapter defines China's defense (military) strategy and assesses whether that strategy is implemented effectively. Measuring the effectiveness of China's defense strategy using Young's method entails identifying the strategic objectives of that strategy and then examining whether China's defense budget is sufficient to achieve those strategic objectives. This method therefore calls for qualitative and quantitative analysis of the current CMS, published as a defense white paper in 2015. The qualitative analysis examines the historical background of CMS in order to understand the driving forces behind China's adoption of the current strategy; the latest defense white paper to define China's strategic objectives; and scholars' views to investigate any additional considerations driving the CMS's creation, continuation, and success. The quantitative analysis examines a variety of documents related to the defense budget and expenditures of China's military, as the authoritarian government of China does not release a full report on what it budgets for and spends on its military. Findings suggest that the CMS is being effectively implemented because the whole government is supporting this strategy under the rule of the CCP. Furthermore, effectiveness is likely ensured because there is no shortage of financing to implement the strategy while China's economic growth lasts, and because the development of China's military is positively affecting civil–military relationships in China, which leads to stable domestic politics.

### A. QUALITATIVE ANALYSES

Modern China is the product of 4,000 years of history, rich military tradition, and philosophy. At the same time, the modern Chinese military strategy is best characterized by an era of communist rule led by Mao Tse Tung and continued by the CCP in the People's Republic of China. Scholars argue that six to nine major defense and military strategies have been adopted since the founding of the PRC in 1949.<sup>38</sup> Each of the strategies has built

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<sup>38</sup> You Ji, *China's Military Transformation: Politics and War Preparation* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016), 120; M. Taylor Fravel, "Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China's Changes in Military Strategy," *International Security* 42, no. 3 (2018): 37.

on the previous ones: therefore, understanding China's current defense strategy requires examining its historical development. This examination serves as the basis for understanding strategic goals of China's defense strategy.

## **1. Historical Background**

Most of the scholarship consulted for this thesis agrees that the three most significant and influential Chinese strategies in the modern era are active defense, limited regional war under high-technology conditions, and limited regional war of informatization.

Active defense, coined by Marshal Peng Dehuai in the mid-1950s, was the first defense strategy of the PRC. The core of this strategy was inherently defensive: China would only act in response to aggression or attack.<sup>39</sup> The active defense strategy was specifically designed to counter possible Taiwanese and American attacks from the southeast of the country.<sup>40</sup> Active defense fit well into the foreign policy of China in the 1950s: after finding international prestige following the Korean War, the newly established PRC was actively pursuing a peaceful co-existence policy with neighboring states and developing countries in order to unite with them against Western imperialists. China recognized that it needed to establish a strong presence in order to deter Western powers but still be a humble defender and supporter of revolutionary ideology, specifically within developing states.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, active defense was a perfect model to cover both issues. This strategy was also successfully used against India during the border conflict in 1962, and it still has value in the current international order. Indeed, active defense has become the core guideline of China's current military strategy: today, China is advertising its peaceful development, which it considers mutually beneficial to the international community. The active defense strategy has thus developed into the current strategy.

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<sup>39</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. .

<sup>40</sup> Ji, 120; Fravel, 47.

<sup>41</sup> Nianlong Han, *Diplomacy of Contemporary China*, 1st ed. (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990), 101–10.

Limited regional war under hi-tech conditions was the only Chinese strategy not formed in response to an imminent threat against China; it is widely considered a very influential element of the current military strategy. The U.S. victory in the Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated that technological advancement would play a key role in modern warfare, and Chinese officials felt that the PLA was far behind the technological developmental curve.<sup>42</sup> Chinese military analyst You Ji has said that a properly formulated defense strategy would lead the state to get ready for any war<sup>43</sup> and that such preparation in modern times requires adaptation and implementation of a “high-tech” strategy, which became the base for the subsequent defense strategies adopted by the PLA. In addition, Ji argues that after Mao’s and Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, it was not easy for their successor, Jiang Zemin, to be as influential as his predecessors in the PLA. Therefore, he implemented institutionalization and professionalization of the military in order to have a better disciplined hierarchy from a CCP leadership standpoint. These developments also complemented the “limited regional war under high-tech conditions” strategy by preparing China’s armed forces for their next strategy, limited regional war of informatization.

The limited regional war of informatization strategy was adopted in 2004 by the Chairman of Central Military Commission, Jiang Zemin, who stated, “We must clearly place the basis of preparations for military struggle on winning local wars under the conditions of informationization,”<sup>44</sup>—that is, “comprehensive digitization and networking.”<sup>45</sup> The strategy change reflected the assessment that “informationized warfare will become the basic form of 21st century warfare.”<sup>46</sup> The main objective of the strategy was to prepare for “a war to protect sovereignty and overseas interests under threat of U.S.

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<sup>42</sup> Roger Cliff, *China’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 21.

<sup>43</sup> Ji, 118.

<sup>44</sup> M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Military Strategy: ‘Winning Informationized Local Wars,’” Jamestown Foundation, accessed January 18, 2019, <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-military-strategy-winning-informationized-local-wars/>.

<sup>45</sup> Ben Lowson, “How China Fights: The PLA’s Strategic Doctrine,” *Diplomat*, accessed January 18, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/how-china-fights-the-plas-strategic-doctrine/>.

<sup>46</sup> Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity,” 79.

intervention.”<sup>47</sup> This strategy became an important further step for China’s military modernization, as it requires military forces to have centralized and easily flowing control, which requires fully covered network-centric systems. Later, in 2014, this strategy converted into “informationized local wars,” though its key objective has not changed.<sup>48</sup> In short, informationization is likely to continue to play a critical role in China’s military until China reaches its centenary goals.

China has gathered a great deal of experience while setting and changing its different military strategies, and the current military strategy is basically an iteratively refined product of the Central Military Committee of China. Various considerations have motivated China to adopt new military strategies, and scholars explain the strategies differently. What is certain is that the PLA’s transformation and modernization has occurred largely as a result of the staggering benefits of China’s continued economic development. Furthermore, the changing mindset of defense personnel, along with the digitalization, informationization, and mechanization of the PLA, are all critical to the current strategy: “As pointed out by senior PLA officer, superiority lies not only in advanced technology but also in advanced ideas of military science.”<sup>49</sup> Moreover, as Ji notes, “PLA researchers argue that new technology will not win wars without new combat theory. New theory will not be invented without fundamental changes to the mentality of PLA commanders and soldiers.”<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, China’s unique political decision-making system under the CCP continues to allow the PLA to have a sole authority to develop its strategy—unlike in democratic countries where different parties come into power, shifting the political trends that shape defense strategy. All these different factors combine to shape China’s current military strategy.

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<sup>47</sup> Ji, 121.

<sup>48</sup> Fravel, 80.

<sup>49</sup> Ji, 16.

<sup>50</sup> Ji, 20, 21.



## **2. Defining Objectives of China's Current Military Strategy**

China's defense white paper of 2015 is a strategic document that outlines China's military strategic goals and objectives. According to this document, China's overarching goal is to rejuvenate the nation and reach the Chinese Dream of hegemon status by achieving two centenary goals by 2021 and 2049.

The PLA is the key stakeholder in Chinese internal and external politics due to its role as the military wing of the CCP—a role that guarantees that the PLA will have priority in budget allocations, since the strategy firmly announces that China's armed forces are the only backup for the nation's core interests. What China is doing today to modernize its military is extremely expensive; nevertheless, China has been able to maintain the modernization of its military throughout the last two decades and has not shown any signs of stopping or slowing down this modernization. According to the current strategy, to achieve its overarching goal, China's military has put forth the following strategic tasks, which depict its strategic objectives and therefore, for the purposes of this research, stand in for those objectives:

- To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territorial land, air and sea;
- To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland;
- To safeguard China's security and interests in new domains;
- To safeguard the security of China's overseas interests;
- To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack;
- To participate in regional and international security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace;

- To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism, and terrorism so as to maintain China's political security and social stability; and
- To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social development.<sup>51</sup>

These eight tasks show China's ambition of becoming the dominant power in the world while maintaining domestic stability. Some of these tasks and objectives overlap. Subsequent sections of the strategy develop supporting ideas and initiatives to accomplish these tasks, such as the principles the military would need to execute "active defense" strategic guidelines, the key approaches for developing the armed forces, the requirements of the Preparation for Military Struggle, and confidence-building measures for the PLA to have a favorable security environment. Looking at each objective in relation to its connecting material makes possible a clearer understanding of the overall strategy. The following paragraphs outline each objective of the defense strategy, analyzing that strategy and comparing its presentation in the white paper to different organizations' security reports and different scholars' explanations.

China's first stated objective is "To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territorial land, air, and sea."<sup>52</sup> This comprehensive objective appears to include all other objectives and is comparable to any state military's ultimate goal. Nevertheless, China prioritized this objective as its very first strategic task of the armed forces, which illustrates China's forethought to look outside of the country. As is mentioned in the third section of the strategy, forward looking strategic guidelines should lead to a holistic approach to prepare the armed forces for any contingencies and improve the Preparation for Military Struggle. The successful implementation of this strategic guideline requires China to have joint-force

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<sup>51</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>52</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

capability and to delegate authority to every level of command. The strategy acknowledges this requirement and states that building a self-dependent integrated combat force and optimizing China's military strategic layout would fulfill the requirement. The strategy then introduces principles for the PLA to maintain in order to accomplish a successful active defense.<sup>53</sup> These principles would cost a tremendous amount of time, effort, and money; regardless, China has continued with its military reform. This reform requires a change to the strategic postures of China's services, which is mentioned in the fourth section of the strategy.<sup>54</sup> According to the strategy, under the overarching goal of building a fully capable joint force, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would move from theater defense to trans-theater mobility; the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would shift from offshore waters defense to offshore waters defense and open seas protection; and the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) would add territorial offense to territorial defense.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, the strategy illustrates force development requirements in critical security domains such as open seas, space, cyber space, and nuclear, which aligns with another of its objectives, "To safeguard China's security and interests in new domains; and to maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack."<sup>56</sup>

China's military reform has not only been executing the aforementioned overarching strategic objective but also running other objectives and tasks simultaneously. China is exerting great effort to achieve its strategic objectives to the greatest degree possible in a short amount of time since president Xi Jinping has highlighted that China is in a period of opportunity.<sup>57</sup> The next objective, "To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland,"<sup>58</sup> concerns preventing Taiwan's independence and attaining resolution for disputed areas around the country. Another objective, "To perform such tasks as

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<sup>53</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>54</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

<sup>55</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

<sup>56</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>57</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, 37.

<sup>58</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests' protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social development,"<sup>59</sup> has a generic tone; however, protection of its rights and interests implies that China would use force if Taiwan sought independence. Nevertheless, China's use of force to annex Taiwan would force U.S. military intervention.<sup>60</sup> Therefore, China's military reform and buildup are largely preventative measures to protect its strategies from U.S. intervention. Such measures present a challenge for China to implement since the U.S. defense budget in 2018 was over \$700 billion compared to China's \$175 billion.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, U.S. power projection capability around the world is still dominant compared to China's, even in China's periphery.<sup>62</sup> Therefore, preventing U.S. intervention would require an extreme amount of resources since China has to catch up in both expenditure and capabilities. A possible shortcut for China to compete against U.S. dominance is investing in the new security domains, which explains China's next strategic task/objective, "To safeguard China's security and interests in new domains."<sup>63</sup> A large part of China's military buildup serves this objective; the creation of the Strategic Support Force, the PLA Rocket Force, and the successful tests of Chinese hypersonic glide vehicles in 2017 mark the achievement of this objective, albeit at great monetary cost.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, maritime disputes and border conflicts provide China the opportunity to flex its growing military muscles and to adjust for the international response to its activities, mostly in the South China Sea.

It is hard for China to move forward with its next strategic objective, "To safeguard the security of China's overseas interests,"<sup>65</sup> without solving these problems of disputed

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<sup>59</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>60</sup> Heath et al., *The PLA and China's Rejuvenation*, 31.

<sup>61</sup> Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, "China's 2018 Military Budget: New Numbers, Old Worries," *Diplomat*, accessed September 5, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-2018-military-budget-new-numbers-old-worries/>.

<sup>62</sup> RAND Project Airforce, "An Interactive Look at the U.S.-China Military Scorecard," accessed September 16, 2018, <https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html>.

<sup>63</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>64</sup> Robert Work, "The Chinese Are on the Verge of Dominating a New Domain: Near Space," *Task and Purpose* (blog), *National Interest*, January 20, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-chinese-are-the-verge-dominating-new-domain-near-space-24124>.

<sup>65</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

areas first. The great example of China's outward policy in pursuit of these overseas interests is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is considered by many countries an extension of China's strategic reach into the Indian Ocean and other important economic corridors to have an uninterrupted energy source and influence over other countries.<sup>66</sup> The PLA would be the defender of this project since China invests money in other countries for the project, which will require China's military to have capacity and capability to operate far from the country. Hence, this requirement aligns with military buildup, and the project's success would bring more resources to expand China's economic development and thus to increase its military capacity, which it can then use to further expand its global economic activities.

This creation of a continuous circle should be the main fuel of the Chinese Dream, but hard military power itself might not be sufficient to completely safeguard China's overseas interests; indeed, China's military buildup might undermine its interests by changing threat perspectives of the countries in the region. Hence, China's military strategy has other objectives to bring military means to the table in different ways: "To participate in regional and international security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace" and "To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social development."<sup>67</sup> These objectives both serve to improve the image of China's military in the minds of domestic and international audiences. In addition, PLA does have many bilateral and regional activities to improve military-to-military relationships globally, and military diplomacy has become the critical link in China's foreign policy.<sup>68</sup> As the U.S. congressional security report 2017 reports, "PLA continues to prepare MOOTW (military operations other than war) including emergency response, counterterrorism, international rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operation, and various

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<sup>66</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, 153, 161–63.

<sup>67</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>68</sup> "Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications," Institute for National Strategic Studies, accessed September 17, 2018, <http://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1249897/chinese-military-diplomacy-20032016-trends-and-implications/>.

other security tasks.”<sup>69</sup> These efforts show how China wants to look peaceful during their enormous military reform.

The remaining objectives, “To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism, and terrorism so as to maintain China's political security and social stability”<sup>70</sup> and “To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack,”<sup>71</sup> are critical to the success of the rest of the objectives. China has serious internal problems in Xinjiang and Tibet that could incite separatism and terrorism and further undermine the country’s political and social stability. Therefore, the CMS has to have a particular approach to overcome such situations—otherwise, China could struggle to achieve its overall goal. Similarly, having nuclear deterrence and second-strike capability provides China a strategic posture that enables it to run ambitious military reform to increase conventional and nuclear capabilities in all security domains. M. Taylor Fravel argues that China does not change its nuclear strategy because it does not delegate nuclear authority to the military; rather, central leaders, scientists, and weapon designers play the key role in formulating this strategy.<sup>72</sup> Instead of changing its strategy, China concentrates on improving its nuclear capacity and capability. Without such a solution to its internal problems and an ultimate backup, it would be hard for China to achieve its goals, which indicates the importance of these two objectives.

There are strong supporting links between the eight strategic objectives/tasks of China’s armed forces. These links allow China to save time, resources, and effort as it pursues many of these objectives simultaneously, making this strategy seem well designed; understanding the strategy by looking at its historical background and reading the strategy itself does give such an impression.

This view is largely shared by a number of scholars. China has continued to achieve its CMS objectives and military transformation uninterruptedly in the last few years,

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<sup>69</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, 63.

<sup>70</sup> Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

<sup>71</sup> Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

<sup>72</sup> Fravel, 39, 40.

regardless of their tremendous cost, which raises the question of how China keeps funding these exorbitant projects while at the same time managing internal social costs and its substantial foreign investments.<sup>73</sup> Scholars explain this management success of the strategy from different angles. Timothy Heath raises two arguments with regard to the influence of the current CMS:

- Control of the country comes from the single ruling party's guidance, which not only provides underlying logic to the military strategy but also filters and classifies national and national security concerns into proper fields. Therefore, all the national security tasks and responsibilities are well-segregated and overlapped when necessary, in relation to funding/efficiency.<sup>74</sup>
- The strong leadership of Xi Jinping contributes three key concepts to the success of the CMS: a vision of security that has expanded to include all domains (political, economic, military, territorial, cultural, social, scientific, technological, informational, ecological, financial, nuclear, open ocean, space, and cyberspace); blurred lines between civilian and military tasks; and increased importance of crisis management and deterrence (shift toward coercive but non-violent expansion of influence).<sup>75</sup>

All of the guidance and concepts unite all organizations' efforts under China's pursuit of national rejuvenation, and military policy has departed from an exclusively defensive reality toward coercive but non-violent expansion.<sup>76</sup> Chinese scholar Ji brings up the transformation of the PLA as one of the key contributors to the successful evolution of the CMS. He highlights that China has never completely overhauled its old military strategy when adopting a new one in order to modernize. Therefore, the CMS has kept

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<sup>73</sup> Robyn Dixon, "China Has Spent Billions in Africa, but Some Critics at Home Question Why," *Los Angeles Times*, accessed September 6, 2018, <http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-china-africa-20180903-story.html>.

<sup>74</sup> Joe McReynolds, *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, 2017, 11–21.

<sup>75</sup> McReynolds, 22–29.

<sup>76</sup> McReynolds, 1–36.

improving every time China adds to its experience. He even emphasizes that the “PLA transformation was part of the social revolution in China that would decide the country’s future in general and that of the PLA in particular.”<sup>77</sup> Improvement of the PLA is underlined by the forward-looking vision of the current strategy, which resulted from the goal of changing the PLA from quantity to quality and moving its strategic posture from defensive to offensive.<sup>78</sup>

Fravel conducts detailed studies of the internal factors driving the development of the CMS. His key arguments include the ideas that China’s civil–military relations and the internal unification of the CCP are factors that have led China to adopt the best strategies in the military. He notes that the “China case shows that military professionalism can take root even in armed forces subject to extensive political control, challenging Samuel Huntington’s claims that politicization harms professionalism.”<sup>79</sup> This claim draws attention to the fact that China’s civil–military relations are a unique driving force for both creation of the military strategy and the successful implementation of it. He also claims that the “Science of Military Strategy” publication is the bedrock for China’s effective military strategy. “Science of Military Strategy” comes out of the brain of the PLA (the Academy of Military Sciences, AMS, and the National Defense University, NDU) with the filter of central leadership. This document includes fair assessments of security situations and proper visions of what type of wars China might fight and how to win them.<sup>80</sup>

Finally, Roger Cliff uses an all-inclusive methodology to create an overall picture of China’s military strength, including doctrine, organizational structure, weaponry, personnel, training, logistics, and organizational culture.<sup>81</sup> His assessment of China’s military doctrine uses three criteria: “whether the doctrine is designed for the types of contingency the country is likely to encounter ... whether the doctrine is consistent with the capabilities of the country’s military and the capabilities of its likely adversaries ... [and]

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<sup>77</sup> Ji, 22.

<sup>78</sup> Ji.

<sup>79</sup> Fravel, 39.

<sup>80</sup> McReynolds, *China’s Evolving Military Strategy*, 40–68.

<sup>81</sup> Cliff, *China’s Military Power*, 7.



whether the doctrine integrates the capabilities of different services.”<sup>82</sup> Under these criteria, his assessment suggests that China’s military doctrine/strategy has been improving in order to keep up with the requirements of the last two decades.<sup>83</sup> All scholars agree that continuous one-party politics running the armed forces makes the CMS efficient and that the strong leadership of Xi Jinping has accelerated China’s achievement of its strategic objectives.

## **B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS**

Quantitative analysis requires some bold assumptions to find answers about what China has done to achieve its military strategic objectives since the PRC government does not provide transparent information about its defense expenditures; China announces only an overall number for its defense expenditure for the year in March.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, this study seeks evidence from various sources about what China has spent in order to achieve each of its CMS objectives.

The analysis begins by examining general information on China’s defense budget and expenditures to identify the features of China’s defense-related quantitative information. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Jane’s, and various states’ governments provide plenty of reliable security reports and information about China’s military development and defense spending; however, China’s defense expenditure looks different depending on what open-source information one consults. Regardless, reputable sources’ calculations do not differ by significant quantities, and, more importantly, their numbers increase or decrease at the same time. Therefore, this study uses the Jane’s by IHS Markit database to eliminate unnecessary confusion.

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<sup>82</sup> Cliff, 18.

<sup>83</sup> Cliff, 17–36.

<sup>84</sup> “China’s Defense Budget,” Global Security, accessed September 11, 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm>; “Deciphering China’s Latest Defence Budget Figures” SIPRI, accessed September 10, 2018, <https://www.sipri.org/node/377>.

Jane's shows that in the last few years, China's defense budget has been increasing, even during the years when its economic development slowed—specifically, after 2015, the year China published its new defense white paper and started military reforms (see Table 1).

Table 1. Total Defense Budget by Force for China.<sup>85</sup>

Category	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>GDP</b>	10623.5	11337.5	12110.1	12899.8
<b>Defence Budget</b>	172.288	183.399	191.244	207.568
<b>Total Defence Procurement</b>	32.632	35.031	37.021	40.253
<b>Army Budget</b>	87.259	89.450	91.036	97.863
<b>Navy Budget</b>	29.093	31.588	32.104	35.585
<b>Air Force Budget</b>	33.643	38.094	42.026	45.414
<b>Defense-Wide Budget</b>	22.292	24.267	26.078	28.706

(All data shown in USD B)

A variety of reports illustrate that China's defense budget is much lower than its total expenditure. Some defense-related expenses are financed by different ministries' budgets and local administrative budgets.<sup>86</sup> This approach allows China to report smaller official defense-spending numbers to support their claim that they are not arms-racing. More importantly, it supports the CCP's tendency to blur the line between civilian and military duties and increase the dependency of the PLA on the civilian side and vice versa. Table 2 shows how different the budgets and expenditures are.

<sup>85</sup> Adapted from Craig Caffrey, "China Defence Budget," Jane's, accessed September 17, 2018, [https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/DefenceBudgetsReports/Display/jdb\\_a011-jdb\\_](https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/DefenceBudgetsReports/Display/jdb_a011-jdb_).

<sup>86</sup> "China Defence Budget," Jane's, accessed September 17, 2018, [https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/DefenceBudgetsReports/Display/jdb\\_a011-jdb\\_](https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/DefenceBudgetsReports/Display/jdb_a011-jdb_); "China Military Spending/Budget," Global Security, accessed September 17, 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm>.

Table 2. Comparison of the China's Official Defense Budget and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Estimate of Chinese Defense Expenditure.<sup>87</sup>

Title	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Official budget (USD million)</b>	78,530	84,260	94,890	105,790	117,100	136,000	144,000	144,300
<b>DoD expenditure estimate (USD million)</b>	150,000	N/A	160,000	120,000–180,000	135,000–215,000	165,000	180,000+	180,000+
<b>Expenditure times official budget</b>	2.14	N/A	1.75	1.13–1.70	1.15–1.83	1.21	1.25	1.25

China used to provide data to the United Nations regarding the composition of its budget, including personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment, until 2013, when it stopped. Nevertheless, Jane's draws a better estimate, including major trends of China's defense spending based on its own databases and other reports (see Table 3).<sup>88</sup> Numbers in all trends are increasing—a sign of China's continuous effort to build an ever-stronger military force to reach its first centenary goal of completing “the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CCP celebrates its centenary” while economic development still supports the CMS.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Adapted from Caffrey.

<sup>88</sup> Adapted from Caffrey.

<sup>89</sup> Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

Table 3. Total Defense Budget by Activity for China. Including Spending on All Forces.<sup>90</sup>

Category	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Other	9,510.04	10,414.47	11,275.40	11,765.96	12,384.03	13,090.44
Ops and Maintenance	47,602.40	52,158.17	56,377.03	58,829.74	61,936.60	65,487.03
Military Personnel	67,104.88	73,499.54	76,671.82	77,231.09	80,973.33	85,260.38
Research and Development	9,075.65	9,978.55	10,877.65	11,471.58	12,224.12	12,995.67
Procurement	31,077.41	34,125.98	36,645.08	38,239.33	40,301.66	42,657.08
<b>Total</b>	<b>164,370.38</b>	<b>180,176.71</b>	<b>191,846.98</b>	<b>197,537.70</b>	<b>207,819.74</b>	<b>219,490.60</b>

(All data shown in USD M)

With regard to the visibility of China’s military capabilities, Michael Glosny<sup>91</sup> highlights that China never hides its intentions of pursuing its defense strategy; however, Beijing is extremely cautious about revealing any information related to military capability. Table 4 shows service-branch expenditures, but it also shows that China did not allocate anything for the newly established People’s Liberation Army Strategic Rocket Force and People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, which are administratively separate forces from the three service branches and are critical elements that require a significant amount of resources to establish and operate. Keeping any information on new security domains secret implies that Glosny’s point is correct—that China is keeping its military capabilities vague to the public.

<sup>90</sup> Adapted from “China,” Chart summary, Jane’s, accessed January 22, 2019, <https://janes.ihs.com/dashboard/country/China>.

<sup>91</sup> Michael Glosny, “China’s Assertiveness, Rebalancing/Pivot, and the Future of China’s Rise” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 10, 2018).

Table 4. Total Defense Budget by Force for China. Including Spending on All Activities.<sup>92</sup>

Category	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<b>Defense-Wide</b>	21,579.92	23,313.19	25,385.26	26,936.23	28,740.36	29,927.40
<b>Air Force</b>	32,281.90	35,183.47	39,848.40	43,409.28	45,469.24	47,368.76
<b>Navy</b>	26,880.36	30,425.10	33,043.47	33,160.34	35,628.35	39,809.43
<b>Army</b>	83,628.20	91,254.95	93,569.85	94,031.85	97,981.79	102,385.01
<b>Total</b>	164,370.38	180,176.71	191,846.98	197,537.70	207,819.74	219,490.60

(All data shown in USD M)

Overall, the data shows that China is still hungry to build a strong modern military and that their numbers will likely increase as long as the Chinese economy can support the country's current military strategic goals. Various security reports about China's military buildup highlight that Beijing has implemented major structural changes in the military hierarchy systems to have centralized effective control of the armed forces and joint force capability. This structural change has happened at all levels, from political decision-making down to the tactical level. This change includes a reduction in the number of departments in the Central Military Committee; creation of a joint staff department; reorganizing seven military districts to five theater commands; and creation of Strategic Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, and Joint Logistic Support Force.<sup>93</sup> These changes are all resource intensive, but no information so far has suggested any sign of a finance shortage for the modernization of China's armed forces. Moreover, China has been militarizing islands in the disputed South China Sea and at the same time building and operating overseas military facilities in Djibouti. China's maritime emphasis has increased, and they have participated in a variety of bilateral and multinational exercises far from their own ports. China emphasizes that non-engagement war and cyber, space, and electromagnetic domains facilitate the possibilities of this approach. In addition, MOOTW has become a huge trend

<sup>92</sup> "China," Chart summary.

<sup>93</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, 1–4.

in China's armed forces, and the PLA has dramatically increased its participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and peacekeeping operations. All of these endeavors are serving the success of the CMS and are clear examples of how China spends for its military. Unfortunately, it is not possible to clarify how much is spent for each of these different objectives, but based on the increasing defense expenditures of China, it would not be wrong to assume that CMS is being implemented effectively.

### **C. CONCLUSION**

Qualitative and quantitative analyses of China's military strategy suggest that Beijing is implementing the current CMS effectively. From the qualitative point of view, the CMS falls under the strong and achievable overarching goal of the Chinese Dream and its two centenary goals. All eight strategic objectives/tasks not only perfectly fit under the main goal but also support each other. Former military strategies and strategic guidelines serve as the firm foundation of the current CMS, which saves time and resources. Continuous one-party rule and the PLA's relation to the party and to the society further support China's achievement of its strategic objectives. As a political wing of the party, the PLA's development has become part of the social revolution, which continues to blur the line between civilian and military missions in order to reach the goal of the Chinese Dream. Economic development is the main fuel of the CMS's success; at the same time, development of the PLA is one of the major enablers of this economic development. The charismatic new leader of China is accelerating this military reform with his "new" vision in support of the Chinese Dream.

Likewise, quantitative analysis offers no information suggesting that China cannot achieve military modernization. The CCP does not overload its defense department with "unachievable tasks": it divides the workload among other ministers, and they are all serving the sole goal of the Chinese Dream. Someone once said that China is strong when united, and its execution of the CMS is an example of why China is rising so fast under undemocratic rules against all odds.

### **III. RUSSIA'S DEFENSE STRATEGY STUDY**

This chapter seeks to define Russia's defense strategy (Russian Military Doctrine) and assess whether that strategy is currently being implemented effectively. To answer that question, this chapter employs the same method used in the previous chapter: here, too, Young's method for measuring the effectiveness of a defense strategy entails identifying the strategic objectives of Russia's defense strategy and then examining whether Russia's defense budget is sufficient to achieve those strategic objectives. This method therefore calls for qualitative and quantitative analyses of the current Russian Military Doctrine (RMD), approved by the President of the Russian Federation on December 25, 2014. The qualitative analysis examines the historical background of the RMD in order to understand the driving forces behind Russia's adoption of the current strategy, then the current RMD paper itself, and other reports to define Russia's strategic objectives and to unearth any additional factors behind the RMD's creation, continuation, and success. As the authoritarian government of Russia does not release a realistic report on what it budgets for and spends on its military, the quantitative analysis examines a variety of documents related to the defense budget and expenditures of Russia's military. Findings suggest that the RMD is not being effectively implemented because the Russian economy is not strong enough to support strategic objectives of the RMD.

#### **A. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS**

As was the case with the CMS in Chapter II, understanding the history of the RMD is essential to comprehending the current doctrine: as Mary E. Glantz argues, understanding this history could help predict future Russian military developments and can therefore give insight into the objectives and priorities of the current strategy.<sup>94</sup> This section first examines the history of Russian defense strategy development then draws upon that history to distill current strategic objectives of Russian military doctrine from published Russian official documents and various scholarly sources.

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<sup>94</sup> Mary E. Glantz, "The Origins and Development of Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 7, no. 3 (September 1994): 443, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13518049408430154>.

## **1. Historical Background**

Before embarking on a history of Russian strategy, it is important to note that there is a difference in the Western and Russian military traditions regarding the term “doctrine.” In the West, doctrine refers to regulations such as those contained in a field manual, but for Russians, military doctrine encompasses high-level strategic documents.<sup>95</sup> Scholars’ studies of the history of Soviet/Russian military strategy and doctrine suggest that there are four key historical legacies that still resonate in the current doctrine. These legacies include Frunze’s offensive principle of military doctrine, Frunze’s military-political and military-technical aspects of military doctrine, Soviet nuclear policy, and foresight/forecasting and correlation of force concepts. The following paragraphs explain the origins of these legacies and how they are implicated in the current RMD.

The very first military doctrine of the Soviet Union, adopted in 1924, was based on M. V. Frunze’s offensive strategy-centered ideology, and this offensive military doctrine still echoes in the latest military doctrine of Russia.<sup>96</sup> Frunze proposed offensive principles based on the Leninist philosophy that war between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries was inevitable. Therefore, Frunze believed, the Soviets needed an offensive military doctrine. Moreover, since the Soviet military was the power behind the world proletarian revolution, Frunze held that it needed an ideologically proletarian, strategically offensive, and unified military doctrine.<sup>97</sup>

The Soviet/Russian military doctrine has retained this offensive nature since its inception, despite the costs. During World War II, the Soviets paid a high toll for not having a defensive doctrine in the first half of the war; however, they believed that the offensive doctrine led them to victory in the second half.<sup>98</sup> Russia maintains this approach today. From a Western perspective, Russia’s current aggressive behavior causes constant problems in the international security environment. Former Defense Intelligence Agency

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<sup>95</sup> Glantz, 443.

<sup>96</sup> Glantz, 446, 447.

<sup>97</sup> Glantz, 444.

<sup>98</sup> Glantz, 452.



director Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart has stated that “Moscow will continue to aggressively pursue its foreign policy and security objectives by employing the full spectrum of the state’s capabilities. Its powerful military, coupled with actual or perceived threat of intervention, allows its whole-of-government efforts to resonate widely.”<sup>99</sup> From Lenin to Putin, the West’s fear of the Soviet Union/Russia has forced the latter to have strong military power to fill the gap of economic and technological underdevelopment by offensive military means.

Second, the first military doctrine of the Soviet Union consisted of military-political and military-technical aspects, and throughout Soviet/Russian history, these concepts have been part of all military doctrines; the terms are currently used in the latest doctrine as concepts that define Russia’s military relationship with foreign states. Glantz states that the “military-political side of the military doctrine is determined by and reflects a state’s military policy.”<sup>100</sup> Soviet/Russian administrations have used this side of the doctrine as a political tool to express their stance on the military doctrine, maintaining that, contrary to the approach described in the previous paragraphs, their military activities are only defensive in nature. However, the Soviet Union/Russia always has offensive capability on the military-technical side, which poses a threat to the West. Glantz says the military-technical side is “more apt to change and evolve in consonance with global technological change.”<sup>101</sup> Glantz further explains that the military-technical aspect of Soviet/Russian military doctrine is largely dependent on military-political realities and many other influencing factors in order to adopt changes in realms such as military science, military art, and the study of past wars and possible future wars. It also covers how to train and educate armed forces personnel and what weapons to equip them with.<sup>102</sup> The Gulf War in 1991 and Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008 pushed Russia to make political decisions to adopt new doctrine in order to fill the technological gap between Russia and the West.

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<sup>99</sup> United States Defense Intelligence Agency, “Russia Military Power,” Prefix.

<sup>100</sup> Glantz, 447.

<sup>101</sup> Glantz, 447.

<sup>102</sup> Glantz, 447, 448.

Third, since the Cold War, the Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons policy has offered key strategic leverage for deterring the West and Western influence in the Soviet/Russian sphere. According to Glantz, the Soviets publicly acknowledged the destructiveness of nuclear weapons in 1953 and released their first nuclear policy in 1956.<sup>103</sup> Prevention and deterrence of nuclear war turned a new page in the Soviet military doctrine, which incorporated Strategic Rocket Forces on the military-technical side and a peaceful coexistence principle on the military-political side of the doctrine by 1959.<sup>104</sup> A first-use of nuclear weapons policy was adopted in 1993 in the first post-Soviet military doctrine<sup>105</sup> while the Russian economy was in a difficult condition, which is similar to the policy used by NATO while its conventional force was weak after World War II.<sup>106</sup>

In 2000, Russia extended its nuclear policy. Nikolai Sokov argues that the Military Doctrine-2000 broadened the possibilities of using nuclear weapons against both conventional and nuclear threats posed by Western powers due to the expansion of NATO in 1997 and the Western intervention in Kosovo in 1999.<sup>107</sup> Sokov further highlights that the 2000 doctrine exposed Russia's intent to use nuclear weapons to prevent the escalation of conflicts and prevent foreign interference in Russian internal affairs, predicting that such interference could be the beginning of a large-scale war.<sup>108</sup> There have been no major changes to the Russian nuclear policy since the Military Doctrine-2000; however, the current relationship between Russia and the United States might cause huge setbacks for the stability of Russian nuclear policies.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Glantz, 454.

<sup>104</sup> Glantz, 54.

<sup>105</sup> "Nuclear Weapons in Russia | Russian Nuclear Sites & Weapons Program," NTI, accessed November 30, 2018, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/nuclear/>.

<sup>106</sup> Aleksey Georgievich Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, The Marshall Center Papers 2 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall Center, 2000), 16.

<sup>107</sup> Nikolai Sokov, *Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 1, 1999), <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-2000-military-doctrine/>.

<sup>108</sup> Sokov.

<sup>109</sup> Abigail Stowe-Thurston, Matt Korda, and Hans M. Kristensen, "Putin Deepens Confusion about Russian Nuclear Policy," *Russia Matters*, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, October 25, 2018, <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/putin-deepens-confusion-about-russian-nuclear-policy>.

Finally, foresight/forecasting and correlation of force have been important tools for Soviet/Russian military officials, and current Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov uses the terms “in his descriptions of how to design an efficient Armed Forces contingent for Russia.”<sup>110</sup> Timothy Thomas argues that these two major concepts of Russian military thinking have long constituted Russian military strategy and military doctrine.<sup>111</sup> Thomas uses a variety of definitions from Soviet and Russian generals’ works to define foresight and correlation of force. According to the Soviet *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary-1983*, foresight is defined as follows:

The process of gaining knowledge of possible changes in the area of military affairs, determination of the prospects of their future development. Knowledge of the objective patterns and mechanisms of war and dialectical-materialist analysis of events taking place in a given specific historical situation constitutes the basis of scientific foresight.<sup>112</sup>

In other words, foresight is based on continuous study of historical repetitions of particular types of events and also “reality checks”—unforeseen developments that arose in a given situation. Thomas also quotes the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* that “foresight’s complexity is determined by risk, chance factors, and insufficient information on an enemy.”<sup>113</sup> Today, warfare is extended to many other dimensions, such as cyber, space, and information, which makes it extremely difficult to use foresight to analyze an adversary’s activity precisely. Therefore, Russia’s leaders promote hybrid warfare, which they call New Type Warfare, in order to be unpredictable.<sup>114</sup>

Correlation of force comes in extremely handy if there is a successful close-to-reality foresight/forecasting. Correlation of force, according to Thomas, is defined in the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* as follows:

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<sup>110</sup> Timothy L. Thomas, *Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015), <https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo106734>.

<sup>111</sup> Thomas, 41.

<sup>112</sup> Thomas, 53.

<sup>113</sup> Thomas, 53.

<sup>114</sup> Timothy Thomas, “The Evolving Nature of Russian Way of War,” *Military Review: Professional Journal of the U.S. Army* (July–August 2017), <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2017/Thomas-Russias-Way-of-War/>.

An objective indicator of the combat power of opposing forces, which makes it possible to determine the degree of superiority of one force over the other. Correct calculations and estimates of relative strengths help make substantiated decisions, established in a timely manner and used to maintain the required superiority over the adversary in selected sectors. It is determined by comparing quantitative and qualitative characteristics of subunits, units, combined units, and armaments of friendly and enemy troops (forces). It is calculated on a strategic, operational, and tactical scale throughout an entire area of operations, in the main sector and in other sectors.<sup>115</sup>

In other words, correlation of force means the best management of arraying forces against an adversary force and its intent. Thomas highlights that Russian strategists will likely continue to use foresight and correlation of force due to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense research organizations' application of similar methodology in 2014.<sup>116</sup>

## **2. Defining Objectives of Russia's Current Military Doctrine**

While these historical concepts are essential to understanding the current RMD, even with a knowledge of those concepts in hand, clearly defining the objectives of the current RMD is not an easy task due to the opaqueness and generality of the doctrine, which allows it to be vague and malleable depending on the Russian administration's decisions about how to employ the doctrine. This section therefore looks at three different accounts of recent developments in RMD to draw out general objectives of the current RMD. These accounts are Russian sources concerning the RMD itself, including the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense website; the Defense Intelligence Agency's 2017 Russia Military Power report; and the European Parliament's 2017 analyses of Russia's National Security Strategy and military doctrine. Together, these sources suggest that, under the overarching strategic goal of gaining Great Power status, Russia has three main objectives in its military doctrine:

- **Objective 1.** Try to stay untouchable by posing a military threat, mostly to the West and its allies

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<sup>115</sup> Thomas, *Russia Military Strategy*, 56, 57.

<sup>116</sup> Thomas, 58.

- **Objective 2.** Enhance current military prowess while politically extending security relationships with non-Western and peripheral countries, and maintaining the Russian economy and public order in a supportable condition for military purposes
- **Objective 3.** Improve new-domain warfare technologies such as space, information, and high-precision weapons to gain a dominant position in the world and boost the defense industry to have technologically and materially independent production.

These three objectives have to be achieved under centralized command of the President of the Russian Federation and require simultaneous and concurrent measures to achieve, and the legacy concepts outlined in the previous section are still influential in achieving these objectives.<sup>117</sup> The following paragraphs describe how each account distills various objectives with relatively different perspectives under the influence of these historical legacies.

*a. RMD and Russian Federation Ministry of Defense*

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense website condenses the Russian Armed Forces' objectives into four major dimensions:

1. Deterring the military and political threats to the security or interests of the Russian Federation
2. Supporting economic and political interests of the Russian Federation
3. Mounting other-than-war enforcement operations
4. Using military force<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," 7.

<sup>118</sup> "Objectives of the Russian Federation Armed Forces : Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation," accessed December 12, 2018, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/tasks.htm>.

If one considers these four dimensions to include all the different tasks and duties described in the military doctrine, understandably, Russia's main means of deterrence is its offensive capability conferred by nuclear and conventional weapons, which has historically been the country's key deterrent against NATO and the United States (objective 1). In order to continue to successfully deter Western military power, Russia needs economic and political strength based in domestic and international support (objective 2). International support comes through extended security relationships with non-Western and peripheral countries, whereas domestic support will come from patriotically educated citizens.<sup>119</sup> Mounting other-than-war enforcement operations related to Russian hybrid and asymmetric operations requires foresight and correlation of force to succeed. General-Lieutenant Andrey Kartapolov, Chief of Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff, has noted that "nonstandard forms and methods are being developed for the employment of our Armed Forces, which will make it possible to level the enemy's technological superiority. For this, the features of the preparation and conduct of new-type warfare are being fully used and 'asymmetric' methods of confronting the enemy are being developed."<sup>120</sup> Obviously, military force is the last resort, especially nuclear weapons due to their costs and consequences. In order to add one more escalating step for deterring the West, the RMD highlights the development of high-precision weapon systems and new-domain warfare elements (objective 3).<sup>121</sup> Even though from the military-political side the doctrine acknowledges as its goals only the defense of the state, civilians, and military, from a military-technical perspective, Russia requires offensive capability rather than the military means themselves, as the historical legacies highlighted.

***b. Defense Intelligence Agency's Russia Military Power Report***

The next account, the Defense Intelligence Agency's Russia Military Power report, highlights some points that were not stated in previous RMDs, including the changing nature of modern conflict, the concept of non-nuclear deterrence, mobilization of the

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<sup>119</sup> Russian Federation, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," 21f.

<sup>120</sup> Thomas, "The Evolving Nature of Russian Way of War."

<sup>121</sup> Russian Federation, 26.

readiness of the state, and strategic stability concepts.<sup>122</sup> One of the most prevalent trends in the nature of modern conflict is the advent of important short initial periods of cyber-enabled information battlefield spaces. The speed of cyber-enabled information and battlefield spaces shortens the hours of kinetic operations down to milliseconds, which requires decision makers to be decisive in making quick and proper strategic, operational, and tactical decisions.<sup>123</sup> Therefore, according to General Gerasimov, military and political decision makers need to be knowledgeable about foresight and correlation of force by requirement. Russia, the report claims, has no choice but to foresee possible future security environment changes before its economically and technologically advanced Western adversaries in order to gain advantage. Therefore, it implies that Russia will have stronger requirements for Russian military command and control capabilities (objective 3).

The concept of non-nuclear deterrence is also stressed in the report: “inflicting unacceptable damage on any adversary at any time,” it says, is the key to employing non-nuclear deterrence (objective 1).<sup>124</sup> On the other hand, the report indicates that Russia needs to have the capacity to defend itself from similar threats posed by adversaries; hence, it claims, Russia uses foresight and correlation of force to apply asymmetric measures to equalize its military power to the West’s until it develops strong enough high-precision weapon systems for non-nuclear deterrence. The report also underlines mobilization readiness of the state, which is the idea that the critical element of the state’s military strength comes from the public.<sup>125</sup> The RMD states that one of its aims is “to unite efforts of the State, society and individuals in defending the Russian Federation; and implement measures, aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of military patriotic education of Russian citizens and their preparation for military service” (objective 2).<sup>126</sup> These different measures assure strategic stability, which is the “total of political, economic, military, and other measures (e.g., force) retained by states in the stable balance whereby neither side

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<sup>122</sup> United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 22, 23.

<sup>123</sup> United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 22.

<sup>124</sup> United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 22.

<sup>125</sup> United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 22.

<sup>126</sup> Russian Federation, 21f.

has the opportunity, interest, or intent to carry out military aggression.”<sup>127</sup> Strategic stability will be the ultimate goal of Russia at least until 2020, when most security-related Russian strategic documents expire.<sup>128</sup>

***c. European Parliament’s Policy Department Analysis***

The European Parliament’s Policy Department analysis states that Russian security policy has drifted toward hard military power since 2014, clearly indicated by the fact that Russia changed all its security-related strategic documents in a shorter-than-normal timeframe.<sup>129</sup> The study highlights that Russian military reform has achieved some successes with an improved force structure different from Soviet times, an efficient joint command-and-control system, more professional personnel, an efficient military training system of “training to fight,” testing of some new weapons in current military operations, and attempts to project power in limited terms (objective 2).<sup>130</sup> Nonetheless, it says, Russia still lags behind the West. Therefore, Russia is shifting its strategic deterrence away from unlimited military power and to a complex toolkit for any size of contingencies (objective 1).<sup>131</sup> The toolkit includes prevention of foreign interference in instigating internal disputes, Anti Access, Area Denial capability, electronic warfare capability, nuclear weapons, cyberattacks, political and economic pressures, and non-war operations (objective 3).<sup>132</sup> In the meantime, Russia employs a hyperactive foreign policy to strengthen the multipolar international order while diminishing the West’s influence in world affairs.<sup>133</sup>

Examination of these three sources indicates that the RMD is the fundamental strategic document of Russian security trends, and their analyses all comport with the aforementioned three main objectives. It is not possible to prioritize any of these three

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<sup>127</sup> United States Defense Intelligence Agency, 23.

<sup>128</sup> Russian Federation, 4.

<sup>129</sup> Isabelle Facon, *Russia’s National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine and Their Implications for the EU*, (Belgium: European Parliament Sub-committee on Security and Defence, February 1, 2017), 6.

<sup>130</sup> Facon, 11, 12.

<sup>131</sup> Facon, 15.

<sup>132</sup> Facon, 15, 16.

<sup>133</sup> Facon, 17.



objectives, as they all have to be at least maintained, if not achieved, at the same time for Russia not just to accomplish its ultimate goal of great power status but for the Russian Federation to survive in a competitive world.

## **B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS**

To assess whether Russia is effectively achieving these strategic objectives, the quantitative analysis begins with an overview of Russian military spending. Based on this information, it then assesses whether Russia is effectively implementing its defense strategy.

### **1. Russian Military Spending: Overview**

Julian Cooper, a British specialist on the Russian defense budget and military expenditures, states that the “Russian federal budget is characterized by a high degree of non-transparency in relation to spending on defense and security. This particularly applies to the procurement and armaments and spending on individual services of the armed forces.”<sup>134</sup> Nevertheless, several different sources contain Russian defense expenditure-related information, including internationally recognized databases like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Jane’s as well as government reports from various states, and Russian defense expenditures appear slightly different depending on what open-source information one consults. Regardless, none of these reputable sources’ calculations differ by significant quantities, and more importantly, their numbers increase or decrease at the same time. Therefore, this analysis uses the Jane’s by IHS Markit database as its benchmark for information on Russian defense expenditures. That said, some scholars criticize these sources, arguing that they miscalculate in their analyses of Russian defense spending. The present analysis therefore also looks at scholars’ views to supplement the database information.

Jane’s states that the Russian economy is very dependent on oil and gas prices, and in 2014–2016, sharp oil price declines, along with Western countries’ economic sanctions

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<sup>134</sup> Julian Cooper, “The Funding of Nuclear Weapons in the Russian Federation,” Oxford Changing Character of War Centre, October 2018, 1.  
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b09141053471>.

imposed against Russia for its annexation of Crimea, caused the Russian economy to undergo a recession.<sup>135</sup> This situation directly affected the Russian defense budget and forced Russian defense spending down by 15%. Before 2015, Russian defense expenditures had increased annually by 12% on average, peaking in 2015 at \$60.5 billion.<sup>136</sup> The economic section of the Jane's executive summary of Russia highlights that “regaining earlier economic growth momentum will hinge on tackling severe structural problems; otherwise, the average pace of GDP growth will range between 1.5% and 2.0% per year.”<sup>137</sup> In any case, the defense budget has not been increasing as it was before 2015 due to careful planning to lower fiscal deficits (see Table 5).

Table 5. Russian Defense Budget by Category<sup>138</sup>

Category	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>GDP</b>	1576.9	1570.0	1597.3	1630.2
<b>Defense Budget</b>	60.491	56.678	50.911	51.631
<b>Defense budget as (%) of GDP</b>	3.84%	3.61%	3.19%	3.17%
<b>Total Defense Procurement</b>	23.706	20.425	16.626	18.047
<b>Army Budget</b>	20.369	19.492	17.928	17.950
<b>Navy Budget</b>	13.522	12.544	11.133	11.348
<b>Air Force Budget</b>	12.286	11.412	10.143	10.335
<b>Defense-Wide Budget</b>	14.314	13.230	11.707	11.998

(All data shown in USD B)

<sup>135</sup> “Russia Defence Budget,” Jane's, accessed December 6, 2018, <https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/1327402#>.

<sup>136</sup> “Russia Defence Budget.”

<sup>137</sup> “Russia Defence Budget.”

<sup>138</sup> “Russia Defence Budget.”

Unlike China, Russia provided annual defense expenditure information to the United Nations until 2016.<sup>139</sup> Hence, Jane's draws a detailed estimate from what Russia provided to the United Nations, including major trends in Russian defense spending based on its own databases and other reports (see Table 6).<sup>140</sup> The personnel category takes up the largest proportion of Russian defense budgets because of a program to raise the pay of military personnel by 4%.<sup>141</sup> This development implies that Russia is concerned about improving the quality and professionalism of its military personnel by raising service members' living conditions publicly.

Table 6. Total Defense Budget by Activity for Russian Federation.<sup>142</sup>

Title	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Procurement	14,517.82	18,783.40	23,706.00	20,424.90	16,626.16	18,047.25
Research, Development, Training and Evaluation	4,183.10	5,542.64	5,604.06	4,611.73	3,482.06	4,083.90
Military Personnel	19,796.56	17,887.87	19,330.74	19,427.51	19,079.57	19,108.25
Ops and Maintenance	7,225.33	7,873.33	10,363.43	10,679.69	10,154.95	9,060.91
Other	879.85	803.95	1,486.99	1,533.75	1,568.19	1,330.31
<b>Total</b>	<b>46,602.66</b>	<b>50,891.19</b>	<b>60,491.22</b>	<b>56,677.58</b>	<b>50,910.93</b>	<b>51,630.62</b>

(All data shown in USD M)

<sup>139</sup> United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, "UN Report on Military Expenditures," UNODA, accessed December 12, 2018, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/milex/CountryProfile.aspx?CountryId=163>.

<sup>140</sup> "Russia Defence Budget."

<sup>141</sup> "Russia Defence Budget."

<sup>142</sup> "Russian Federation," Chart summary, accessed December 6, 2018, <https://janes.ihs.com/dashboard/country/Russian%20Federation>.

Regarding the Russian State Armament Programs (SAP), Jane's states that Russia's midterm assessment of its SAP 2011–2020 and the aforementioned budget cuts forced Russia to amend SAP 2011–2020 in 2014, and a second, SAP 2018–2027, was approved earlier this year. SAP 2011–2020 aimed at ensuring 70% of all service equipment would be renewed to satisfy modern standards by 2020. SAP 2018–2027 required 20 trillion rubles to accomplish its goal of renewing 70% of all service equipment to modern standards by 2021. The new SAP goal is difficult to achieve given Russia's current economic condition; however, overall 10-year funding is possible to accomplish if no other economic hindrance comes up until 2027.<sup>143</sup> Additionally, the Jane's analysis includes the fact that the Russian government does not provide any funding breakdown information by service when it provides defense funding information to the United Nations; therefore, Jane's estimates the Russian funding breakdown by services as follows: 35% army, 22% navy, 20% air force, and 23% defense-wide functions (see Table 7).<sup>144</sup>

Table 7. Total Defense Budget by Force for Russian Federation.<sup>145</sup>

Category	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>Army</b>	16,458.52	17,203.64	20,369.48	19,491.80	17,928.13	17,950.01
<b>Navy</b>	10,043.52	11,237.36	13,522.27	12,544.18	11,132.70	11,347.65
<b>Air Force</b>	9,204.01	10,260.54	12,285.55	11,411.56	10,143.41	10,335.13
<b>Defense-Wide</b>	10,896.61	12,189.65	14,313.92	13,230.04	11,706.69	11,997.83
<b>Total</b>	46,602.66	50,891.19	60,491.22	56,677.58	50,910.93	51,630.62

(All data shown in USD M)

<sup>143</sup> "Russia Defence Budget."

<sup>144</sup> "Russia Defence Budget."

<sup>145</sup> "Russian Federation," Chart summary.

The overall data shows that Russia is still trying to renew all service equipment to modern standards by 2021 and build a strong modern military, which could provide strategic stability. Nevertheless, overall economic conditions limit the possibilities of increasing defense expenses to execute the current SAP 2018–2027 successfully. The analysis highlights that there is a narrow chance to accomplish the SAP. Once again, though, Russia's success still depends on the market price of energy-related exports and punitive actions from the West against Russia.

Not all sources agree that Russia's chances to achieve its current SAP are so narrow, however. Michael Koffman, an expert on Russian military activities and defense funding, argues that the Russian defense budget is not decreasing to the extent that the Jane's and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data suggest it is. The last few years of Russian defense budget reductions, he claims, were not double digits but in reality only single digits, and he criticizes Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Jane's for missing this fact in their reports.<sup>146</sup>

The discrepancy, he claims, is a result of Russia's misleading the world about its military spending to subvert adequate understanding of its capabilities by rival powers. According to Koffman, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has used five methods to make it appear as if the Russian defense budget collapsed by 20% from 2016 to 2017 and further declined in the following years. First, in 2016, the Russian MoD started paying back its defense debt, which it had purposely stacked up to a trillion rubles to defense contractors, making the 2016 budget much bigger and next year's budget smaller. Second, the MoD found a way to save a large amount of money on defense contractors by paying after receiving the products, which helped the budget appear smaller to the public. Third, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Jane's analyses measured Russian defense spending in USD, which did not adjust for the exchange rate and purchasing power parity and caused Russia to appear to have declining budget numbers consecutively from 2016 until now. Fourth, the defense budget appeared to decline as

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<sup>146</sup> Michael Koffman, "The Collapsing Russian Defense Budget and Other Fairy Tales." *Russia Matters*, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, accessed December 7, 2018, <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/collapsing-russian-defense-budget-and-other-fairy-tales>.

percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), while the absolute levels of cuts were not as high. Finally, due to advance announcements by the Russian Federation MoD, large budget cuts already seemed to have happened in people's minds, when in fact the cuts were smaller than the ministry claimed.<sup>147</sup>

Russia adopted the new military doctrine and National Security Strategy in the dawn and dusk of 2015 and the new foreign policy concept in 2016. Based on Koffman's argument, one could suspect that these Russian tricks started working after Russia changed all security-related strategic documents at the very moment of its economic hardship and aggression in Ukraine and Syria.

## **2. Implementation of Current RMD: Assessment**

The three objectives of the RMD should have been three sides of a wheel. Without even sides, it cannot roll—cannot reach Russia's overall goal of Great Power status. Unfortunately, too much use of one side of the wheel makes the sides uneven and causes the wheel to bump or even stop. The first objective of the RMD—pose a military threat to the West and its allies—has been a shield of Russia, and Moscow has been using it since the Cold War era. Unfortunately, too much use of military strength against its neighboring country, Ukraine, backfired on Russia's economic development, which was its only fuel for achievement of the three objectives of the RMD. Data shows that Russia's continued 12% annual economic growth stopped the year the Russian Federation annexed Crimea. As a result, Russia's overall strategic goal of attaining great power status will not be achieved by 2020, which is the time specified in the RMD.

In terms of the second objective—extending security relationships and maintaining the Russian economy and public order in a supportable condition for military purposes—Russia has done a tremendous job of improving its military capability since 2008 with its military reforms, and Russian armed forces' capabilities are much better now than in 2008. Even so, Russia still lacks strategic airlifts, tanker aircrafts, and blue water capabilities to become great power military, and it needs to overcome financial constraints, lack of qualified

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<sup>147</sup> Koffman.

personnel, and defense industry problems during international sanctions and restrictions to get what it wants.<sup>148</sup> Nonetheless, according to the data from Jane's, it is not possible at least until 2020—again, because its pursuit of objective one, posing a threat, has significantly slowed Russia's economy. Politically, Russia pursues building an alliance (such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) that could challenge NATO and Western countries, but the current international order supports Russian adversaries, not Russia's new alliances. Additionally, it is hard to know how long the Russian public will support the current administration with the limited life possibilities under authoritarian rule.

The third objective—improving new-domain warfare technologies and establishing technologically and materially independent production in the defense industry—also faces financial difficulties to accomplish its strategic tasks. The Russian defense industry, which is the cream of the crop of the Russian economy, lacks the financial resources to run its newly adopted State Defense Industry Program. Specifically, according to Alexei Nikolski, “as part of the State Defense Industry Program, 929 new manufacturing facilities (ranging from new plants to minor additions to the existing facilities) are scheduled for launch in 2016–2020. Only 37 new facilities were launched under the previous federal program, with a further 368 under construction, so the ambitious new target does not appear realistic.”<sup>149</sup> Without enough manufacturing facilities, it will be hard for Russia to develop new technologies and weapons.

This is not to say that Russia has achieved nothing in its military reforms. However, if a goal has conflicting objectives, it cannot be effectively implemented. This situation raises the question of what might happen if Russia waits until it has economic independence to interfere in neighboring states militarily. Overall, the first objective has always been successful due to the damage Russia can inflict with its military power. Yet, Russian military power only protects Russia from military threats. Military power cannot provide protection from economic sanctions and market price drops, which causes objective one to hinder the other objectives of the RMD.

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<sup>148</sup> Anton Lavrov, “Russian Military Reforms from Georgia to Syria,” CSIS, November 15, 2018, 25, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-military-reforms-georgia-syria>.

<sup>149</sup> Alexei Nikolsky, *Not Just Money Constraints Facing the Russian Armed Forces*, CNA Occasional Paper series (Washington, DC: CAN, August 2018), 6, 7.

## C. CONCLUSION

Qualitative and quantitative analyses of the RMD suggest that Russia is not implementing the current RMD effectively, largely due to Russian economic interdependence on market prices and Western countries' punitive actions against Russia for its aggressive military actions. The Young methodology's criterion for effectiveness is whether a military doctrine has sufficient funds to achieve its overall goal; Russia does not have sufficient funds. Qualitatively, historical legacies inspire Russia to hold on to "traditional military thinking," which promotes its use of aggressive military threats against its rivals to balance strategic deterrence. Sources suggest that Russia has no choice but to use adversarial activities against the West to denounce the current international order, which, according to Russia, does not give equal share to everyone. On the other hand, Russia has forgotten that it still benefits from the current international order today. Internally, Russia promotes patriotism to solidify public support for its activities. Unfortunately, this public support is not based on democratic principles that ensure everyone has equal opportunities but instead on authoritarian requirements to love and defend the homeland from the West. Therefore, it is not clear how long Moscow can maintain support from its own people, because the true victims of economic destabilization and sanctions from the West are not Russian decision makers and oligarchs but rather common people.

The quantitative data supports the aforementioned analysis. The Russian economy is sensitive enough to falter based on market price changes of its major exports and foreign countries' economic sanctions. Continued growth of the Russian economy since 2000 was interrupted by these causes right after Russia renewed all its strategic security documents to turn the country on "full aggressive mode." Scholars state that Russia has significantly improved its military, but they also say that such improvements are not enough to achieve the strategic goal of great power status. Military power does not provide protection from economic punishment.



## IV. CONCLUSION

As the previous chapters have discussed, Western scholars state that China and Russia are major spoilers that could cause serious disruption in the prevailing international security environment due to their conflicts of interest with the United States, which is the creator and beneficiary of the current international order and which therefore stands to check China's rise and Russia's resurgence. This thesis has aimed to add value to the literature about defense strategy implementation by China and Russia by providing a side-by-side view of the effect of these states' records of implementing their respective defense strategies. While there is no standard measurement of how effectively a defense strategy is being implemented, Young's method offers a way to assess whether a defense strategy has sufficient funds to achieve its stated objectives. Based on this method, this research finds that China has been effectively implementing its defense strategy, while Russia has not. China has so far successfully implemented its defense strategy for three reasons. First, one-party rule of this authoritarian country forces the whole nation's efforts into military development, which complements economic expansions abroad by backing up those expansions in the long run. Second, the coherent strategic objectives of the CMS under the overarching goal of the Chinese Dream allow China simultaneously to pursue all objectives at the same time. Third, and most importantly, China's economic growth has allowed China to have sufficient funding to enact huge military improvements. The Russian defense strategy, by contrast, has not been implemented effectively due to the country's lack of economic independence necessary to provide enough resources to achieve the RMD's objectives. Moreover, RMD objectives conflict with one another, which creates serious problems, not only for implementation of the RMD, but also for the country's overall economy.

Even if Russia's and China's defense strategy implementation results look very different at the moment, they do have some similarities. The next section conducts a comparative analysis of China's and Russia's defense strategies based on the countries' relative levels of success in efforts both disparate and similar. Then, the chapter answers the sub-question of the thesis: What lessons might these defense strategies offer a smaller

state—specifically, Mongolia—to improve its defense strategy in the context of the current global security environment? The discussion also presents some brief conclusions.

## **A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

At first glance, China's and Russia's defense strategy objectives and implementation records share a number of common characteristics. Both countries are authoritarian regimes, with leaders that have centralized power in their hands. Their common interest is to degrade U.S. influence in the world. Both countries are chasing after technological development of new-domain warfare, which could give them a chance to increase their relative strategic deterrence by means other than conventional military force and nuclear force. Still, since both countries are lagging behind the United States in terms of military power, their key strategic deterrent remains nuclear weapons. Both countries have assertive tones in their military activities, even as both promise they are solely defensive in their strategy. Both countries' military improvements have been dependent on their respective long periods of economic growth.

On the other hand, these countries' approaches to handling those common characteristics contrast widely. Comparative analysis of these different approaches can provide a better understanding of why one strategy is succeeding so far while the other one fails.

The centralization of power in authoritarian regimes of China and Russia came to the leaders in different ways. In China, Xi Jinping's rise to, and centralization of power, is integrated with CCP policy, which leverages defense development as a part of the whole nation's effort to advance; whereas in Russia, Putin used deception and cronyism to gain power, which undermines his popular support in and outside of the country, thereby diminishing the possibilities of strategic implementation, including the defense strategy. President Xi Jinping went through the CCP filter that shapes prominent leaders of the country, and was tested successfully at various levels of political and managerial positions throughout his political career before obtaining China's supreme leader position.<sup>150</sup> From

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<sup>150</sup> CNN Library, "Xi Jinping Fast Facts," CNN, accessed February 20, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/04/world/asia/xi-jinping---fast-facts/index.html>.

the beginning of his career, Xi was a hardcore student of CCP policy and later became a strict producer and executioner of CCP policy; he believes that “unity and discipline under one-party rule is crucial in achieving” his promises to make China rich and strong.<sup>151</sup> Thus, both the president and the party move with the people toward the successful achievement of China’s defense strategy in pursuit of the Chinese Dream. Conversely, president Putin quickly rose from being a mid-level KGB agent to chief of the Russian security service to president of the Russian Federation in just eight years. Moreover, a number of accounts describe how Putin gained power by eliminating his opponents at any cost—including their lives—and keeps the public misinformed by strictly controlling social media so that the public sees only good accounts of Putin.<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, Putin has used his power to implement unpopular policies, such as increasing the retirement age. In comparison to Xi, Putin is much less integrated into the governmental and societal structure. This situation separates President Putin from his own people and from foreign supports, both of which are instrumental engines of successful defense strategies.

Indeed, foreign support plays a key role in both states’ defense strategies. Yet, while China and Russia both have an interest in degrading U.S. influence in the world, they handle this interest differently. Russia tries to build political alliances with nations against the United States and NATO, which is not a stable approach due to Russia’s assertive political behavior, which hinders it from gaining any long-term support from its alliances. It therefore also secures no gain to the implementation of its defense strategy. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been the leading nation of several international organizations, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India China, and South Africa), and the Eurasian Economic Committee (EurAsEC), which mainly aim to reduce U.S. influence. In addition to its involvement in

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<sup>151</sup> “The Thoughts of Chairman Xi,” BBC News, accessed February 20, 2019, [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idd-sh/Thoughts\\_Chairman\\_Xi](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idd-sh/Thoughts_Chairman_Xi).

<sup>152</sup> Deutsche Welle, “Vladimir Putin: How a Spy Rose to Power and Held on to It” DW.COM, March 18, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/vladimir-putin-how-a-spy-rose-to-power-and-held-on-to-it/a-43030900>; “The Beginning and Fraying of Vladimir Putin’s Reign,” *Economist*, January 12, 2019, <https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2019/01/12/the-beginning-and-fraying-of-vladimir-putins-reign>.

these international organizations, Russia has strong bilateral and trilateral agreements with several countries, specifically military political and military technical agreements. Russia tries hard to keep these organizations alive and strong; the latest example is Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov urging the European Union to stop meaningless tariffs against Russia, while Russia economically punishes the European Union itself for satisfying U.S. desires at the Munich Security Conference February 2019.<sup>153</sup> Unfortunately, Russian attempts to leverage its alliances have seen little success due to its assertive behavior and its failure to fulfill its promises to cooperating nations. Moreover, Russia could turn its face against alliances if needed. Therefore, the Russian approach has not succeeded either in its goal of degrading U.S. influence or at extending its security relationships with non-Western countries—a key objective of its defense strategy implementation.

Meanwhile, China has used mostly economic means to pull the interests of countries into its sphere of influence to reduce the position of the United States. Beijing's approach creates more resources and funding through trade and access to resources that support its defense strategy. Notably, China has been employing the Belt and Road Initiative to reach out to Africa and Europe to open a new Silk Road under modern conditions through the land and sea, using their current economic boost to their advantage. This approach offers economic development to China's partners and with no obvious security risks to partnering countries. This approach is in keeping with China's peaceful co-development rhetoric, which offers economic benefits, in contrast to empty Russian promises. After these economic advancements are consolidated, however, China's military force will back up its investments in the long run. Therefore, China's economy-based approach has become a strong bedrock to its defense strategy.

These two states are also in different situations in terms of developing and using new weapon technologies to balance U.S. military power, which has had a direct effect on their respective defense strategy implementation. Recently, both countries announced their

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<sup>153</sup> “С.Лавров: Европын Холбоо Өөрийгөө ОХУ-Тай Утга Учиргүй Сөргөлдөхөөр Болголоо,” [S.Lavrov: European Union puts itself against Russian Federation with no meaning], Mongolian Content LLC, accessed February 20, 2019, <http://news.gogo.mn/r/236406>.

successes at developing new weapon technologies, albeit in a different fashion. In 2018, Russian president Putin used his State of the Union speech to introduce Russia's new weapon systems; his message was directly threatening the United States and NATO, which reveals two setbacks in Russia's position. First, an arms race and military coercion are the last and only cards Russia can play in the great power competition game. Second, this show-of-force behavior only causes continuing economic sanctions from the Western countries in order to limit possible Russian threats. This, in turn, causes a major hindrance to Russian defense strategy implementation since Russia's current national budget is not sufficient to run the SAP. Additionally, Russia's "Possible First Use" nuclear strategy is in a tense situation after the U.S. administration announced that it would withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force treaty, leaving Russia with no other leverage than use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, China introduced its new weapon systems in a commercial air show, intended to send a message to the United States and other powers that China is not behind, but actually ahead in terms of some technology developments. Such hybrid presentations of new weapon systems soften its posture to the international community so that it does not prompt a response that would disrupt its implementation of defense strategies. Additionally, China has enough resources and funding to successfully implement the technological requirements of its defense strategies so far. China is being extremely careful not to look threatening with its new weapon systems in the international community, much as with their nuclear policy of "No First Use," which again harmonizes with the peaceful development rhetoric fundamental to Chinese soft power, its path of successful defense strategy implementation.

Finally, stable economic growth from the end of the last century gave momentum to both countries to increase their economic and military powers. Yet, because Russia's economic improvement was largely dependent on energy export revenue, after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, other countries have been able to impose sanctions that caused serious problems for the implementation of Russia's defense strategy. On the other hand, China developed its economy via high levels of manufacturing, which leads to more development by building infrastructure, increasing the number of consumers, and creating services. This development allows China to be economically independent, making other

countries dependent on China's economy, thereby permitting China to increase its military power more independently than Russia.

The two countries' different approaches raise the question of why they approached these common issues differently. There are many possible reasons, but the strongest cause of their different approaches is funding to run their political and strategic objectives. At the same time, the Russian narrative is influenced by its historically aggressive great power stance, which hinders its defense strategy implementation, as its aggressiveness blocks resources to fund its strategy. By contrast, China's approach is mostly peaceful (for now) and oriented toward producing resources and funding that actually creates a foundation for implementing its strategies freely in the future. Therefore, funding becomes central to the defense strategy's success or failure, and Young's method of measuring effectiveness of defense strategy is the most trenchant way to analyze defense strategy implementation.

## **B. BROADER VIEW ABOUT DEFENSE STRATEGIES OF CHINA AND RUSSIA**

During the time of thesis work, the volatile international security situation has endured some changes, including a trade war between the United States and China and the U.S. administration's announcement of withdrawing from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty, which has caused Russia to become more assertive. Therefore, two interesting questions arise: how long will China's successful defense strategy implementation continue? And is there any hope that the Russian defense strategy can revive?

There will have to be some impact on China's defense strategy implementation due to the current trade war between the United States and China since, as this thesis has shown, economic resources and funding are key to the success of defense strategy implementation. It is clear that if the trade war causes a reduction in defense strategy funding, strategy implementation would suffer. On the other hand, Dr. Yukon Huang claims that there is no winner in the trade war and that the trade war equally punishes the United States and China, or even hurts the former more because China's economic dependency on trade is very low;

conversely, U.S. companies pay this trade war's tariffs.<sup>154</sup> According to this claim, both sides should seek to end this trade war as soon as possible. Yet, the trade war will probably only slow China's defense strategy implementation rather than cause serious issues, since its major opponent, the United States, is also getting punished.

The U.S. announcement of withdrawing from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty caused President Putin to point the nuclear sword right at heart of the United States on the one-year anniversary of his new weapon system's introduction in his State of the Union speech in 2018.<sup>155</sup> Using the same stage as he did during his State of the Union speech, Putin delivered a straightforward message: Russia can hit American land before any American missile in Europe could hit Moscow. This thesis has already concluded that Russia has no options other than military solutions in its great power competition; however, President Putin's action raises the question of what the main goal of this statement was. Was it only to keep the United States away from Russia's periphery, or to find an alliance against America in its "own backyard," using the instability of Venezuela, for a possible site for Russian missiles? Either way, Russia will not gain any economic advantage to improve its defense strategy implementation, unless Russia is trying to drain U.S. resources at the very moment when the that country has too many issues to worry about, including the U.S.–China trade war, the South China Sea situation, Venezuelan crisis, competition in the Arctic, conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, and U.S.–North Korea summits. It could be detrimental to U.S. influence if Russia is employing this methodology in harmony with China since Russia and China are allied through the SCO, BRICS, and bilateral agreements.

### **C. ANSWER TO THE SUB-QUESTION**

China's and Russia's defense strategies offer little that can be used to improve the defense strategies of smaller states such as Mongolia, since most smaller states do not have

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<sup>154</sup> Yukon Huang and Markos Kounalakis, "Trading Blows: The U.S.-China Trade War," World Affairs Council (presentation), posted December 4, 2018, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_IfAzGKaSkA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_IfAzGKaSkA).

<sup>155</sup> "Putin to U.S.: I'm Ready for Another Cuban Missile-Style Crisis If..." Reuters, February 21, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-idUSKCN1QA1A3>.

enough resources to keep their defense capabilities up to date. A defense strategy has to fit to a country as clothes fit a person. Too often, there are people who want excessive weaponry, believing that they can intimidate other countries, which could cause problems, just like a three-year-old child playing with a knife. Nevertheless, smaller states can use some of the principles of defense strategies of stronger nations if they fit. China's defense strategy was improved throughout its evolution by keeping what was effective and getting rid of what was ineffective. Also, the one-party policy of China has allowed its defense strategy to be more stable. The Russian defense strategy study suggests that its objectives have to be achievable, and, most importantly, there should not be any contradicting objectives that could cause defense strategy implementation to fail. Smaller countries should keep a friendly relationship with all countries if possible, meanwhile improving defense capabilities by increasing personnel capacity based on professionalism, as well-trained personnel are the highest value of a small army.

Mongolia has been actively participating in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, Ukraine, and Georgia with individual peacekeepers and military contingents, and also in the global war on terrorism by sending its military contingents to Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the Mongolian Armed Forces has been organizing and participating in international and regional military exercises in various places with many countries. These activities strengthen Mongolia's third-neighbor foreign policy and increase personnel capacity to operate in a variety of places. Successful participation in these types of activities can be an important part of defense strategy implementation for relatively small and weak states, as these activities further enhance the capabilities of personnel. Additionally, highly skilled diplomats are required to keep the balance of great power competition pressure at an appropriate level for smaller states. Therefore, smaller states have to improve individual skills of soldiers and diplomats at the highest possible level in order to improve their defense strategy in the context of the current global security environment.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

This study and comparative analysis of China's and Russia's defense strategies suggests that merely possessing military power does not equate to successful



implementation of a defense strategy. Without economic resources, it is not possible to implement any strategy. This outcome fits well with the common military phrase that “amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals discuss logistics.” Moreover, no matter what the size of a country, it needs to have its own defense strategy, with an achievable goal and consistent objectives, along with the required resources for success.

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